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Articles
Sources of Commitment to Social
Justice
Dorothy E. Roberts*
Several years ago I pinned a cartoon on my wall to remind me
of the possibilities and the failures in the quest for social justice.
The cartoon depicts a Black mother sitting next to her daughter
who is tucked in bed in a dilapidated apartment.' The mother
reads aloud from a book entitled "Fairy Tales:"
"Golly, let's do it!," the President told the National Commis-
sion on Children. "If we can finance a Persian Gulf War, we
can find the money to make every child in America healthy
and secure!"
Now, nearly a decade later, as the cartoon has curled at the
edges and turned yellow, the prospect that the fairy tale will come
true has grown even dimmer. In August 1996, the liberal Presi-
dent Clinton signed into law a sweeping welfare reform measure
that ended the New Deal federal guarantee of cash assistance for
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versions of this article at the Stanford Law School Faculty Workshop and at the
1997 Charles L. Ihlenfeld Lecture in Public Service and Ethics at West Virginia
University College of Law, and thank the participants for their comments. Thanks
also to Sara Buehler, Stanford Law School Class of 1998, for her excellent research
assistance and comments. Completion of this article was supported by the Elyse
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1. Kevin Siers, Charlotte Observer (June 26, 1991), at 10A.
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American children living in poverty.2 By that point the main-
stream debate on welfare had completely excluded any considera-
tion of enhancing aid to the poor. It is easy to forget that America's
welfare system even before the new law was passed already stood
out among Western nations for its stinginess and limited social
programs.3
Of course, welfare is not the only institution that needs to be
fixed to create a just society-a society in which all citizens are
treated with equal respect and dignity. I realize many readers will
disagree with me about what that Nirvana would look like. But,
putting that question aside for a moment, I want to address in this
essay how we go about getting there. 4
Social activists and scholars have struggled with the question
of how to persuade people with different backgrounds and conflict-
ing interests to unite in an effort to achieve social justice. In re-
searching welfare reform activism, I have noticed two major
appeals that appear to make opposite assumptions about human
nature. One strategy is to show people that helping others is actu-
ally in their own self-interest. This approach assumes that human
beings are primarily motivated to take actions that will benefit
themselves. The second strategy is to try to convince people to
have empathy toward others-to imagine themselves in the shoes
of less fortunate Americans and, being moved by their new appre-
ciation of others' situation, to offer to help. This approach assumes
that human beings are sometimes motivated to act on behalf of
others because they care about others, even when they realize no
direct benefit. In this essay, I want to evaluate these two appeals,
2. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); see also Joel F. Handler & Yehes-
kel Hasenfeld, We the Poor People 5-11 (1997) (summarizing the Act, welfare re-
form and its effect on poverty).
3. See generally Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled (1994) (discussing the
history and modern problems of welfare); Joel F. Handler & Yeheskel Hasenfeld,
The Moral Construction of Poverty: Welfare Reform in America (Judith L. Hunter
ed., 1991) (discussing the ideology and structure of the American welfare state and
its modern reforms).
4. Of course, one's notion of the ideal society and assumptions about human
nature will help to determine one's view of strategies proposed to achieve social
justice. I want to focus in this essay on a preliminary evaluation of some of the
strengths and weaknesses of dominant strategies. I leave for another day a more
detailed assessment of the effectiveness of particular strategies for achieving par-
ticular visions of justice.
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especially in light of the special difficulties posed by racism, and
then suggest an alternative.
I. Self-Interest
I will begin with self-interest because it is commonly thought
to be the more natural motivation for human action. This is the
accepted view of human nature in liberal thinking and dominant
explanations of political life.5 In Charles Dickens's Hard Times,
Bitzer reminds his hard-nosed teacher Mr. Gradgrind of this fea-
ture of human nature when Gradgrind shows an uncharacteristic
belief in altruism: "'I beg your pardon for interrupting you, sir'...
'but I am sure you know that the whole social system is a question
of self-interest. What you must always appeal to, is a person's self-
interest. It's your only hold. We are so constituted .... *"6 If we
are constituted only to act according to our self-interest, then any
successful effort to achieve social change must demonstrate to new
recruits that the proposed change will benefit them.
Classical liberalism finds justice in institutional structures
that permit individuals to seek their own selfish ends in their own
way, regardless of resulting inequalities in the actual welfare of
persons. 7 This view of justice is grounded in an understanding of
human motivation or moral attitudes; it is, in the words of John
Rawls, "a theory of the moral sentiments."8 Liberal notions of jus-
tice infer that people are motivated primarily by self-interest.
They "assume a limit on the strength of social and altruistic moti-
vation and suppose that, while individuals are prepared to act
justly, they are not prepared to abandon their interests."9 Even
contemporary liberal theorists who show greater concern for equal-
ity than classical ones, such as Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, rely on
a model of self-insurance to construct their vision of a just soci-
5. See generally Jane J. Mansbridge, The Rise and Fall of Self-Interest in the
Explanation of Political Life, in Beyond Self-Interest 3 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed.,
1990) (describing the evolution of the theory of "adversary" democracy based on
self-interest) [hereinafter Beyond Self-Interest].
6. Martha C. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Pub-
lic Life 24 (1995) (quoting Charles Dickens, Hard Times 63 (David Craig ed.,
1969)).
7. See Evan Simpson, Socialist Justice, 87 Ethics 1, 1 (1976).
8. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 51 (1971).
9. Simpson, supra note 7, at 6.
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ety.' 0 Rawls, for example, posits an original position in which we,
as rational, autonomous beings, agree to governing principles
based on what we think would be in our own interest.
The preeminence of self-interest as the basis for justice has
justified the perpetuation of inequalities of race, gender and
wealth. Protecting the liberty of members of powerful groups to
promote their own interests typically takes precedence over efforts
to equalize the distribution of wealth and power in America."
America's progressive social movements have been particularly
stymied by a racist ideology that pits white people's interests
against those of Blacks.
Critical race theorist Derrick Bell makes a compelling case
that Black Americans' "at risk status" is created by society's will-
ingness to "sacrifice black rights, black interests, and even black
lives to enhance the status, further the profits, and settle differ-
ences among whites."1 2 According to Bell, all civil rights gains
have been animated by the principle of "'interest convergence,'"
which posits that "[tihe interest of blacks in achieving racial equal-
ity will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests
of whites."13 He points out, for example, that elementary school
desegregation in the 1950s and the more recent admission of mi-
norities in higher education occurred only when these efforts be-
came advantageous for whites, and did not threaten white
supremacy. 14
10. See Rawls, supra note 8, at 54-60; Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?
Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 283, 315 (1981).
11. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices and the
Limits of Equality, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 363 (1996); see also Richard Delgado, Ro-
drigo's Bookbag: Brimelow, Bork, Heinstein, Murray, and D'Sousa-Recent Con-
servative Thought and the End of Equality, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1929, 1944 (1998)
(book review) (arguing that America's commitment to equality is inherently unsta-
ble in light of the inconsistent embrace of economic liberty; "because free market
economics causes inequality to accelerate over time, we are compelled to assign
more and more traits of hopeless inferiority to the losers in our midst").
12. Derrick Bell, Black History and America's Future, 29 Val. U. L. Rev. 1179,
1179 (1995).
13. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and The Interest-Conver-
gence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 523 (1980).
14. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price
of Racial Remedies, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 3, 14-16 (1979); see also Mary L. Dudziak, De-
segregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 61, 62-63 (1988) (confirming
Bell's hypothesis by demonstrating that U.S. officials pursued desegregation dur-
ing the Cold War because it aided the U.S. in its competition with the Soviet Union
over the Third World); Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Af-
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Some sociologists attribute the plight of America's inner cities
to Blacks' at risk status.15 Because urban centers are filled with
Black people, and secluded from white communities, white Ameri-
cans can simply write them off. As Margaret Weir explained,
"[tihis geographic separation of blacks has important political con-
sequences: it transforms the problems of living in cities into 'black'
problems, making it easier for politicians to solve urban problems
at the expense of poor black residents."16 Many whites find it diffi-
cult to see the cities' fate as a shared interest because improving
the lives of thousands of Black-urban poor does not seem to be in
their self-interest.
The focus on self-interest influences the way we understand
social problems and their solutions in other ways. This mode of
thinking supports the view that each individual is responsible for
her own situation alone. Therefore, self-interest prefers private
remedies for individuals' problems to collective responsibility for
social conditions. According to this view, public remedies should
be reserved for publicly-caused problems; citizens must rely on pri-
vate means to solve problems they created. Tax money actually
goes to many redistributive programs-social security, farm subsi-
dies and corporate bailouts, to name a few. But many Americans
reserve a special condemnation for welfare that redistributes in-
come to poor people because they blame the poor for poverty. Wel-
fare reform proposals increasingly resort to private measures such
as work programs, collection of child support and insurance models
to solve the problem of poverty. Social Security retains its political
popularity because it appeals to Americans' individual self-inter-
est: Americans perceive it as an insurance program in which bene-
ficiaries recoup what they contributed.
Following this course, strategizing to expand the welfare state
has involved devising ways to convince Americans that helping
fairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1641 (1997) (exploring how the federal government's response to the Little Rock
crisis was shaped by Cold War concerns about the negative impact of race discrimi-
nation on U.S. foreign relations).
15. See, e.g., Loic J. D. Wacquant & William Julius Wilson, The Cost of Racial
and Class Exclusion in the Inner City, 501 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 8
(1989) (attributing the "underclass" to the unprecedented social, economic and spa-
tial marginalization of poor Blacks).
16. Margaret Weir, From Equal Opportunity to "The New Social Contract:"
Race and the Politics of the American "Underclass," in Racism, The City and the
State 93, 104 (Malcolm Cross & Michael Keith eds., 1993).
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others is in their self-interest. Some welfare advocates seek to
avoid the problem of interest convergence that Professor Bell iden-
tified by soliciting white support for programs that benefit all citi-
zens. I will call this strategy the universalist solution. 17
Progressive welfare reformers have noted the "political vulner-
ability of targeted"'8 welfare policies-programs that are means-
tested or designed to benefit a disadvantaged group, such as
Blacks. 19 Targeted programs that have a high proportion of Black
beneficiaries, such as subsidized housing, are stigmatized and eas-
ily deleted from the budget when opposed by white taxpayers. An
alternative strategy appeals to self-interest by advocating pro-
grams that base eligibility on universal criteria. Because people
who benefit from welfare support welfare, historian Linda Gordon
argues, "a bigger welfare state is likely to be a more popular one."20
The well-known Black sociologist William Julius Wilson advo-
cated a similar strategy of enhancing the political viability of wel-
fare programs by downplaying their benefits to poor Blacks. 21 As
he explained it, "ft]he hidden agenda is to improve the life chances
of groups such as the ghetto underclass by emphasizing programs
in which the more advantaged groups of all races can positively re-
late."2 2 These universalists reason that an array of race-neutral
programs, which help everyone, can garner far more support from
white Americans than the current vilified system that the public
associates with Black people.
Joel Handler and Yeheskel Hasenfeld recently renewed the
debate over universalism versus targeted programs in their book
We the Poor People, which advocates helping welfare recipients by
reducing poverty through policies addressed to the working poor. 23
Handler and Hasenfeld describe their proposal as targeted univer-
salism, because although the labor-market reforms they suggest
17. For an elaboration on the following critique of universalist appeals, see
Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 Yale L.J.
1563, 1588-92 (1996) (reviewing Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single
Mothers and the History of Welfare (1994); Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare:
How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty (1994)).
18. Quadagno, supra note 17, at 155.
19. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 3, at 305 (critiquing targeted welfare).
20. Id.
21. See William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged 120 (1987).
22. Id.
23. See Handler & Hasenfeld, supra note 2, at 218-25.
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are targeted at the working poor, these programs apply far more
universally than programs aimed only at welfare recipients. They
argue that the current welfare system stigmatizes recipients, and
diverts attention away from the poverty issues of the working poor.
Their universalist approach, on the other hand, avoids dividing the
poor into deserving and stigmatized categories. Rather, "[bly mov-
ing into the paid labor force in greater numbers, single mothers
join in common cause with the rest of the working poor, especially
working mothers, rather than remaining a separate class suffering
additional discrimination."24
I have less faith in the power of universalism. Although uni-
versal programs would constitute a significant improvement over
the current inadequate system, reliance on these programs under-
estimates the degree of white Americans' unwillingness to accept
Blacks as full citizens. I endorse the campaign to reduce poverty
through labor market reforms, and to institute needed social pro-
grams, such as child care and health insurance, for all citizens.
But I do not believe that these universal programs, which citizens'
self-interest supports, can correct institutional inequalities. Uni-
versalism attempts to solve the problem of racial inequality with
programs that paper over, rather than uproot, the social forces
that structure the current racially-stratified system and that per-
petuate racial injustice.
More specifically, universal programs are inadequate for three
reasons. First, it is doubtful that universal programs alone can
guarantee that the poor will receive sufficient aid. The focus on
self-interest that animates these programs will ultimately serve
best the most powerful members of society. Universal programs
have a "trickle up" effect. 25 Programs designed to benefit all citi-
zens are likely to most benefit the most privileged citizens because
they have greater political and economic resources to structure
programs to their advantage. At the very least, universal benefits
must be supplemented with programs based on need to ensure that
those at the bottom actually receive adequate aid. Benefits that
provide the necessities for a decent life-housing, nutrition, ade-
quate income and jobs for unskilled workers-must be adminis-
tered directly to those who need them, or the very poor risk falling
24. Id. at 220-21.
25. I am grateful to Iris Marion Young for suggesting this phrase.
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below the minimal level of welfare. We will need to appeal to
something other than self-interest to convince wealthier Ameri-
cans to support programs that will only benefit poor people or
minorities.
Stephen Sugarman's proposal to provide child assurance sup-
port through the Social Security system illustrates the limits of
self-interested universalism. 26 The new program would operate in
the same way that Social Security operates, except that it would
provide aid to children whose fathers abandoned them as well as
children whose fathers died. This plan to tie child support to So-
cial Security rejects any collective responsibility for children, and
instead appeals to fathers' self-interest to ensure the security of
their own children. It takes advantage of the powerful appeal of-
fered by two popular models of social provision: the insurance
model, which views public assistance as an exercise of self-insur-
ance, and the child-support model, which relies on fathers' wages
to provide for children's economic well-being. It has the advantage
of blurring the distinction between welfare and social insurance by
moving more children into the latter category. In addition, most of
the children who would be eligible for Social Security benefits
under the new plan would receive larger benefits than they cur-
rently do under state-welfare programs.
But think about all the children this proposal leaves out-all
children whose fathers did not work long enough to be insured for
Social Security purposes. Many more children would receive only
minimal benefits because their fathers worked at low wage jobs,
only sporadically, or over a short period of time.27 Furthermore,
some unmarried mothers would be unable to claim benefits be-
cause of complications in proving paternity. The children whom
this model would exclude, or who would receive reduced benefits
are disproportionately Black; meanwhile, the children whom this
model would most benefit are disproportionately white. This is be-
26. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Financial Support of Children and The End of
Welfare As We Know It, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2523, 2561-69 (1995). For a more elaborate
critique of Sugarman's proposal, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Irrationality and Sacri-
fice in The Welfare Reform Consensus, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2607 (1995).
27. For social security eligibility requirements, see Eric R. Kingson & Edward
D. Berkowitz, Social Security and Medicare: A Policy Primer 57-59 (1993). See
generally Karl E. Klare, Toward New Strategies for Low-Wage Workers, 4 Pub. Int.
L.J. 245 (1995) (discussing the ways to bridge the gap between low-wage workers
and organized labor).
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cause white mothers are more likely to become poor as a result of
separation from the father, and white fathers are more likely to
earn the wages necessary to ensure adequate child assurance
benefits. 28
The limited success of efforts to collect child support further
proves that a scheme which relies on fathers' self-interest will
probably provide inadequate care for many children. The idea of
turning to child support as a method of reducing children's poverty
is not new. For more than two decades, Congress and states have
enacted increasingly tough measures designed to recoup welfare
costs by collecting child support.2 9 Yet these campaigns to improve
child support collection have failed either to lower the poverty rate
for children, or to make a significant dent in the number of chil-
dren on welfare. 30
The second problem with the universalist solution is that it
deliberately avoids an attempt to dismantle racist social structures
as the price of appealing to whites' self-interest. Instead universal-
ists rely on the universal distribution of benefits to relieve the
problems these structures create. Universal programs are subject
to Iris Marion Young's criticism of the distributive definition ofjus-
tice: by focusing attention on the allocation of material goods,
Young argues, the distributive paradigm fails to scrutinize the in-
stitutional context that helps to determine distributive patterns.31
Creating programs that maneuver around racism to make them
more palatable to white Americans is likely to weaken their power
to eradicate systemic oppression.
Ultimately, universalist solutions are flawed by their very ap-
peal to the public's self-interest. White supremacy complicates the
persuasive power of arguments based on self-interest. The as-
sumption that universal programs are intrinsically attractive be-
28. See, e.g., Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hos-
tile, Unequal 94 (1992) (comparing earnings of black and white men); Mary Jo
Bane, Household Composition and Poverty: Which Comes First?, in Fighting Pov-
erty: What Works and What Doesn't 209, 227-28, 231 tbl. 9.6 (Sheldon H. Danziger
& Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 1986) (indicating that 22% of poor Black and 49% of
poor white single mothers became poor at the time they established a single-
mother household).
29. See Marsha Garrison, Child Support and Children's Poverty, 28 Fain. L.Q.
475, 476 (1994) (book review).
30. See id. at 502.
31. See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 15-33 (1990).
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cause they benefit everyone crumbles under racism. Racism
creates more than disinterest in advancing the welfare of Black
Americans. Many white Americans see helping everyone as con-
trary to their self-interest because they perceive Black people's so-
cial position in opposition to their own. Under American racist
ideology, universal programs that benefit Blacks are necessarily
antithetical to white interests because Blacks' social advancement
diminishes white superiority. For this reason, many white Ameri-
cans have been unwilling to pay for subsidies and engage in other
social reforms perceived to benefit primarily Blacks, even if these
reforms would also benefit whites. Six decades ago, W.E. B. Du-
Bois observed that white workers resisted labor reform during Re-
construction because, "while they received a low wage, [they] were
compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage."32
Such whites believe that they gain from continued social and eco-
nomic disparities that leave Blacks at the bottom.
Professor Richard McAdams recently explained this interpre-
tation of white self-interest with an economic theory that takes
into account group status, arguing that "[giroups use intra-group
status rewards as a non-material means of gaining material sacri-
fice from members .. ."33 The degree of loyalty among whites and
white hostility toward Blacks contradicts what rational self-inter-
est would seem to dictate. The importance to whites of maintain-
ing their privileged group status explains why selfish white
individuals are willing to engage in costly racial discrimination.
Discrimination against Blacks is a means of producing a valuable
status gain for whites. Whites' calculation of their self-interest in-
cludes not only the material benefits that universal programs
would produce for everyone, but also this powerful desire for es-
teem and status. For many whites, the cost of foregoing the bene-
fits of universal programs may be a worthwhile investment in the
preservation of their superior social position. Establishing univer-
sal programs, on the other hand, fails to compensate white Ameri-
cans for their loss of racial privilege.
Indeed, the popularity of so-called "universal" social insurance
programs has hinged on their formal or effective exclusion of Black
people. New Deal reformers could promote Social Security as a
32. W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America 700 (1963).
33. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1005, 1007 (1995).
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universal program designed to benefit all classes only by first dis-
qualifying Black workers. "Instead of a 'universal' welfare state
that could create solidarity among workers," sociologist Jill
Quadagno notes, "the New Deal welfare state instituted a regime
that reinforced racial inequality."34 Ironically while universal
programs are advocated as a pragmatic means of racial inclusion,
their implementation realistically may depend on racial exclusion.
My quarrel is not with universal programs themselves, but with
the faith in these programs as a way of overcoming white Ameri-
cans' resistance to Blacks' economic and political equality.
Although self-interest is an effective motivation, it is a limited
one. It is unlikely that appeals to the self-interest will persuade
people to relinquish the privileges they now enjoy. The ideology of
racism in America presents a particularly tough obstacle for ap-
peals to self-interest to overcome. I do not mean to suggest that
persuading white people to share their resources is the primary
means of achieving social justice or that it is the only strategy sus-
ceptible to the pitfalls of self-interest. Yet the difficulties inherent
in basing welfare reform on whites' self-interest illustrate that
self-interest alone cannot motivate the kinds of sacrifices for others
that social justice requires.
II. Empathy
If self-interest will fail to produce social justice in America,
where can we turn? Many social activists have proposed cultivat-
ing Americans' empathy for others as an alternative.35 Some femi-
nists, for example, have developed an ethic of caring that contrasts
starkly with the liberal ethic of autonomy and self-reliance. The
ethic of caring, in the words of one ecofeminist, "makes a central
place for values of care, love, friendship, trust, and appropriate rec-
iprocity-values that presuppose that our relationships to others
are central to our understanding of who we are."36 This approach
posits two distinct conceptions of morality: one is based on respect
for persons as autonomous moral equals; the other is based on
34. Quadagno, supra note 17, at 19.
35. See generally Beyond Self Interest, supra note 5 (rejecting a narrow self-
interest theory, and focusing on individuals' commitment to others and to their
own moral principles).
36. Karen J. Warren, The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism, 12
Envtl. Ethics 125, 143 (1990).
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compassion for others because we care about them.37 Some advo-
cates of the ethic of care identify the opposite centrality of the at-
omistic self as a male or patriarchal way of thinking.38 Political
scientists, economists, biologists and psychologists have recently
marshalled empirical evidence and logical argument refuting the
claim that human beings are governed by self-interest alone. 39
Their studies confirm the feminist intuition that people's behavior
is often based on concern for justice, a desire to cooperate with
others, and love.
Perhaps we are constituted to care about and rely on others
just as much as we are naturally selfish. It is easy to conjure up
countless examples where people act spontaneously for unselfish
reasons. A homeless woman reaches out her hand, and you reach
in your pocket and give her a dollar-not because it is in your self-
interest, but because you care. A town is hit by a flash flood, de-
stroying the residents' homes; people from neighboring towns
gather together clothes and relief supplies to take to the washed-
out town-not because it is in their self-interest, but because they
care. A child wanders off in the woods during a family outing;
within hours a group of rescuers gather, searching throughout the
cold night with flashlights until the lost child is found-not be-
cause it is in their self-interest, but because they care.
People may act in these situations because they can empathize
with those in need. They may think, to borrow the words of Presi-
dent Clinton, "I feel your pain."40 Adam Smith explained that we
37. See Robin S. Dillon, Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration, 22 Can.
J. Phil. 105, 106 (1992).
38. See, e.g., Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women's Development (1982) (characterizing the different modes of thought asso-
ciated with the male and female voice); Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Ap-
proach to Ethics & Moral Education (1984) (discussing the ethics of caring from a
female perspective); Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace
(1989) (supporting a feminist and maternal approach to politics); Robin West, Ju-
risprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1988) (discussing the definition of
human being in terms of feminine jurisprudence as contrasted to a masculine
legal theory).
39. See, e.g., Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Culture and Cooperation, in
Beyond Self-Interest, supra note 5, at 111 (explaining an evolutionary model of
human cooperation); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, in Beyond Self-Interest, supra note 5, at 25 (cri-
tiquing economic models based on egoism).
40. Mary Leonard, Mrs. Clinton, Subdued, Signals a Steady Loyalty, Boston
Globe, Aug. 19, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 9149083.
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are concerned about others' welfare because we recognize others as
human beings like ourselves, who share the same hopes, joys and
suffering as we experience. 41 In Legality and Empathy, Lynne
Henderson identifies three stages of empathic capacity: perceiving
others as having one's own goals, interests and affects; imagining
the situation of others; and responding by feeling the distress of
others, which may (or may not) lead to action to relieve the suffer-
ing of others.42 Unlike the Dickensian student who learned that
human beings are constituted to be self-interested, Rousseau's
young Emile learned the lesson of compassion. "'Make him under-
stand clearly,' the teacher is told, 'that the fate of the unhappy can
be his own, that all their ills are beneath his feet, that a thousand
unforeseen and unavoidable events can plunge him into those ills
at every moment.'" 43 We reach out to help others in need because
we know that, as mere human beings, we are not infallible. We
share this human condition that makes each of us vulnerable to
unexpected suffering and deprivation.
People who advocate empathy tend to characterize their pro-
ject as an appeal to our emotions. Some frame the distinction be-
tween their approach and the focus on self-interest as a distinction
between emotion and reason. The term "'empathy'" is derived
from "'Einfuhlung,'" a German word literally translated as "'feel-
ing into.' "44 Our legal and political institutions are modeled on lib-
eral political philosophy that assumes that we are free,
autonomous, self-reliant individuals who operate only in our own
self-interest. That is an abstract notion that exists only in our
heads, but our hearts tell a different story. In our hearts, we long
for connection with others and we know instinctively that each of
us is needy and vulnerable.
In Poetic Justice, legal philosopher Martha Nussbaum ex-
plores the literary imagination as a way of facilitating empathy in
41. See Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 1-69 (Liberty Classics
1976) (1759).
42. Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1574, 1579-
82 (1987); see also Alfie Kohn, The Brighter Side of Human Nature: Altruism &
Empathy in Everyday Life 102 (1990) (identifying a similar three-stage process
involved in empathy).
43. Martha C. Nussbaum, Social Justice and Universalism: In Defense of an
Arisotelian Account of Human Functioning, Modem Philosophy S46, S70 (1993)
(quoting Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile 243 (1974)).
44. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 Ga. St. U.
L. Rev. 385, 389 (1992).
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public moral reasoning.45 Nussbaum argues that imagination and
emotion are critical to, although not sufficient for, constructing
moral theory and developing our moral capacities.46 Literature
plays an important role in this process because it promotes identi-
fication and sympathy in the reader.47 Nussbaum defends the lit-
erary imagination as "an essential ingredient of an ethical stance
that asks us to concern ourselves with the good of other people
whose lives are distant from our own."48 Other recent books, as
well, such as James Wilson's The Moral Sense,49 advocate a more
prominent role for emotion in moral reasoning. Empathy is also a
guiding force behind the legal storytelling movement. This body of
scholarship explores the use of stories in legal reasoning to take
better account of the concrete lives of the people whom the law
affects. 50
The problem I have with this call to empathize with others is
that it so often turns out to be an appeal to self-interest. First,
empathy is often interpreted as finding oneself in others. I must
look for features in my neighbor that remind me of myself, and
then I will be moved to act on her behalf. This exercise easily
transforms into ignoring our differences, and figuring out how we
are really the same. Empathy becomes a projection of myself. In
the end, I may only appreciate and unite with others to the extent
they are like me.
For a long time, white feminists' efforts to find commonalities
among women ended up erasing the identity and experiences of
women of color. 51 Searching for a common oppression implied not
only a universal and essential gender identity common to all wo-
men (that minority women are just white women with color), but
also that white, middle-class women have no racial and class iden-
tity. This way of empathizing, writes Elizabeth Spelman in Ines-
sential Woman, "invites me to take what I understand to be true of
me 'as a woman' for some golden nugget of womanness all women
45. See Nussbaum, supra note 6.
46. See id. at xvi.
47. See id. at xviii-xix.
48. Id. at xvi.
49. James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (1993).
50. See Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law:
New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099, 2099 (1989).
51. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
Stan. L. Rev. 581, 585-86 (1990).
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have as women... [how lovely: the many turn out to be one, and
the one that they are is me."52
Suppose you cannot imagine yourself in the other person's
place? There are some people with whom it is downright difficult
to empathize. I have devoted a good deal of energy defending the
dignity of women who smoked crack during pregnancy.5 3 In the
process, I have discovered that it is virtually impossible to per-
suade many people to empathize with these women, even in the
face of evidence that the government has treated them unjustly.
Lynn Paltrow, an attorney who has represented pregnant addicts
both as defendants in criminal cases and as plaintiffs in a civil
rights action, has devised strategies to divert attention away from
her unpopular clients by focusing on harms that prosecution of
these women inflicts on others.54
Efforts to convince a jury to empathize with these clients was
an utter failure. Paltrow and her co-counsel brought a federal
class action on behalf of poor, Black women in Charleston, South
Carolina. These women were the subjects of a hospital policy that
threatened prosecution to pregnant patients who tested positive
for drugs, but did not complete drug treatment.5 5 Some of the pa-
tients had been tested without consent; were arrested within hours
after giving birth; and taken to jail in hand cuffs and leg
shackles.5 6 The complaint alleged that they were subjected to ille-
gal search and seizure, and to racially discriminatory and abusive
prosecution. Despite proof that this policy was enforced only at a
hospital serving predominantly Black patients, the jury ruled
52. Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman 159 (1988).
53. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction,
and the Meaning of Liberty 150-201 (1997) (discussing the recent trend to prose-
cute substance abusing mothers for child abuse, distribution of drugs to a minor, or
lesser offenses) [hereinafter Roberts, Killing the Black Body]; Dorothy E. Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the
Right of Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419 (1991) (arguing that prosecuting women
who give birth to babies who test positive for drugs violates the mothers' constitu-
tional rights to equal protection and privacy regarding reproductive decisions)
[hereinafter Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts].
54. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 Mich. L. Rev.
938, 955-56 (1997).
55. See id. at 959-60; see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, No. 2:93-2624-2
(D.S.C. filed Oct. 5, 1993) (complaint alleging hospital drug testing policy violated
constitutional rights of pregnant patients).
56. See Roberts, Killing the Black Body, supra note 53, at 166.
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against the plaintiffs.57 One of the plaintiffs' attorneys told me
that she believes she lost the case because the jurors could not
bring themselves to grant a monetary award to women who made
such pitiful mothers.58 Perhaps the trial did not provide enough
training to cultivate the jurors' compassion toward the plaintiffs.
Still, it seems to me that these devalued plaintiffs could have used
a healthy dose of abstract Kantian respect for their intrinsic moral
worth. 59
Is it not rather arrogant to assume that I can truly imagine
what it is like to be you? Can a white person really imagine what
it is to be Black, to live in a culture that presumes your looks, your
intellect, and your morals are inherently inferior? Can a man re-
ally imagine what it is to be a woman; to know for example, the
pervasive fear of sexual assault or the expectation that you will be
a mother? Can a straight person really imagine what it is to be
gay; to be considered deviant according to the official policy of
every institution in society? And is it possible that, not being able
to really imagine it, I conclude that your situation might not be so
bad, afterall?
Some advocates of racial empathy are offended by this sugges-
tion. It hinders cross-racial understanding to claim a unique cul-
tural experience that only group members can comprehend. This
perspective, they contend, threatens civic unity by denying the pos-
sibility of inter-ethnic empathy. Federal appellate Judge J. Harvie
Wilkinson III warns:
To speak of the inaccessible racial experience is to surrender
to the somber role of race in human history and to foreclose a
future based on the productive potential inherent in individ-
ual diversity. Belief in the notion of inaccessible racial cul-
tures simply elevates the supposed racial differences in the
human persona above all else.60
Judge Wilkinson offers the Civil Rights Act, drafted by white Con-
gressmen, as an example of interracial empathy: 'They had not
57. See South Carolina Jury Rejects Claims that Hospital Policy Violated
Rights of Pregnant Women, Reprod. Freedom News, Jan. 17, 1997, at 4.
58. See Conversation with Susan Dunn, plaintiffs' attorney in Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, in Charleston, S.C. (March 21, 1998).
59. See Immanuel Kant, Political Writings 61 (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet
trans., 2d ed. 1991).
60. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Sepa-
ratism in Multicultural America, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 993, 1006 (1995).
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personally experienced what it was like to be denied service at a
restaurant or to be rejected for employment, only because of one's
race. Yet they understood the injustice involved; they could
empathize."1
According to this view, the notion of distinct racial or cultural
perspectives prevents human interaction that transcends our dif-
ferences. Placing undue weight on distinct racial experiences, the
worry goes, blocks channels of mutual understanding. Judge Wil-
kinson contends that "[tlo accept the inaccessibility of racial expe-
rience is also to deny the value of empathy."62 This conclusion
parallels Martha Nussbaum's fear that by "conceding that a mor-
ally arbitrary boundary such as the boundary of the nation has a
deep and formative role in our deliberations, we seem to be depriv-
ing ourselves of any principled way of arguing to citizens that they
should in fact join hands" across the "boundaries of ethnicity and
class and gender and race."6 3 Denying the possibility of inter-eth-
nic empathy prevents progress toward racial harmony.
But what reason do we have to believe that cultural apprecia-
tion has much effect on political arrangements? The relationship
between Black live-in domestics and their white employers re-
minds me of how easily unequal power arrangements can block
any instinct toward empathy. Studies show that even contempo-
rary relationships between domestic servants and their female em-
ployers are often characterized by rituals of deference that
symbolically reinforce the domestic's inferiority and enhance the
employer's ego.64 Most employers prefer to disregard the personal
needs of the hired help. As one contemporary West Indian em-
ployee expressed it, "'It's O.K. for them to ask me to stay extra
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Martha Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, Boston Rev. 3, 19
(1994).
64. See, e.g., Phyllis Palmer, Domesticity and Dirt: Housewives and Domestic
Servants in the United States, 1920-1945 (Ronnie J. Steinberg ed., Temple Univ.
Press 1989) (1946) (juxtaposing the romantic image of housewifery with the low
value social institutions attach to housework and personal services); Judith Rol-
lins, Between Women: Domestics and Their Employers (1985) (analyzing the rela-
tionship between black female domestic servants and their white female
employers).
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time because they have their family together, but what about me?
... They don't think that I have my family waiting for me.'"'65
Judith Rollins writes about the invisibility she experienced
during her field work as a domestic in white homes. Rollins discov-
ered that white employers treated her as though she were not
there: they talked openly in her presence about private matters,
turned down the heat when they left the house, and locked her in
the house without a key. Rollins explained: "These gestures of ig-
noring my presence were not, I think, intended as insults; they
were expressions of the employers' ability to annihilate the hu-
manness and even, at times, the very existence of me, a servant
and a black woman."66 Here we have two women who lived to-
gether in the same home; who experienced intimate details of each
other's lives; who shared the commonalities of gender and mother-
hood. Yet the inequalities of race and class made it impossible for
the mistress to see her servant, much less empathize with her.
Another problem with empathy is that it is sometimes inter-
preted to mean joining with people whom we can understand and
love. The family seems to have been designated as the exclusive
setting for caring relations between people. We look to the family
alone to provide our economic as well as emotional needs. Accord-
ing to sociologist Stephanie Coontz, society's empathy extends only
to people "whom we can imagine as potential lovers or family mem-
bers."67 We are told, for example, to support gay rights because
there is probably someone gay in our family. American society's
embrace of the private family as its model for social accountability
is particularly devastating for Black people. America's legacy of
racial separation makes it especially difficult-if not impossible-
for most white Americans to imagine Black people as part of their
family. I suppose this is not a criticism of empathy itself, but of the
narrow circle drawn around the appropriate objects of empathy.
Thus, empathy is often interpreted as caring for others be-
cause I can imagine myself in their situation. Asking, "How would
it feel if it happened to me?" is quite self-centered. It means that I
am essentially concerned with my own feelings of joy or pain. This
65. Shellee Colen, "Like a Mother to Them": Stratified Reproduction and West
Indian Childcare Workers and Employers in New York, in Conceiving the New
World Order 78, 90 (Faye D. Ginsburg & Rayna Rapp eds., 1995) (quoting source).
66. Rollins, supra note 64, at 209.
67. Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were 115 (1992).
SOURCES OF COMMITMENT
type of empathy leads me to be willing to share with others only
when necessary to protect myself against the risk that I might one
day be in their shoes. This is a fickle sort of empathy: it changes
with the winds of fortune, easily transmuting into pure self-
interest.
A recent New York Times headline announced "The Shift To-
ward Self-Reliance in the Welfare System."68 It compared the "one
for all and all for one" philosophy popular during the Depression
with the current "do-it-yourself" approach "that increasingly re-
quires Americans to make their own way."69 Examples include re-
vamping Social Security so that workers finance their own
retirements rather than those of their elders; the proliferation of
401(K) savings plans in place of guaranteed corporate pensions;
the rise of alternative schools that draw students out of public edu-
cation; and the new welfare reform law that kicks poor people off of
welfare after two years.70
What has changed since the Depression that produced this
philosophical shift? Certainly it is not the eradication of wealth
inequality-that has gotten worse. MIT economist Frank Levy at-
tributes the transformation to Americans' form of self-interested
empathy. 71 During the Depression, many Americans feared that
they would fall into poverty themselves; they therefore supported
social programs that they might someday need for themselves. To-
day prosperous Americans apparently feel more secure about their
future. Seeing no personal payoff, they are unwilling to share their
prosperity with others.7 2
Ironically calls for empathy often boil down to appeals to our
self-interest; our self-absorption limits empathy. Although it
would seem that listening to our hearts would expand the amount
of caring for one another, it can also narrow our range of concern.
Finally, empathy does not guarantee that our emotions will
lead us to act in an ethical or just way.7 3 At times, claimants com-
68. Louis Uchitelle, The Shift Toward Self-Reliance in the Welfare System,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1997, at A15.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Massaro, supra note 50, at 2109 ("The 'empathy' concept does not offer
reasons why human distress is something we should alleviate, or criteria for choos-
ing whose distress should trigger our response."); see also Robin West, Law and
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pete for our empathic response to their plight, and we need some
principle to determine which one deserves our concern. For exam-
ple, in reverse discrimination cases the minority applicant, who re-
lies on affirmative action programs to get a job, and the white
applicant, who claims that these policies unfairly deny him a posi-
tion, both demand our empathy. Imagining the suffering of each
cannot tell us how to act. As Robin West cautions regarding Nuss-
baum's claim, "if we are going to read realistic novels to spur us on
toward political action, then we should be very careful to pick the
right novels." 74
Indeed, empathy for others may not lead us to act at all. There
is no guarantee that the feelings generated by empathy will moti-
vate a response on behalf of others. 75 Carrie Menkel-Meadow
points out that social theorists distinguish the emotional state of
empathy from altruism, which refers to acts of other-directed be-
havior.76 While empathy will assist us to serve people we are com-
mitted to serving for ethical reasons, empathy alone may not
generate the commitment to serve. Empathy and moral commit-
ment may work together in just the opposite fashion: perhaps we
develop an empathic capacity because of our moral duty to sacrifice
for others.77 For example, consider Nussbaum's argument that
reading realistic novels enhances our capacity for sympathetic en-
gagement with others and hence, for moral reflection. 78 Why is it
that some people respond far more emotionally than others to in-
justices described in fiction? I think the reason I become angered
or moved to tears while my teenage son remains unshaken is be-
cause I have developed a stronger moral opposition to the real in-
justices this fiction represents.
Empathy seems too weak a motivation to explain acts of ex-
treme and sustained sacrifice in the quest for social justice. Per-
Fancy, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1851, 1857-65 (1997) (reviewing Martha C. Nussbaum,
Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (1995)) (arguing that em-
pathy toward the suffering of one individual may blind us to competing collective
interests).
74. West, supra note 73, at 1866.
75. See Kohn, supra note 42, at 127; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 44, at 389-
90.
76. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 44, at 389.
77. Carrie Menkel-Meadow notes social science research suggesting that
"helping, when motivated by other reasons, may facilitate empathetic feelings."
Id. at 390 n.20.
78. See Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 53-78.
SOURCES OF COMMITMENT
haps empathy accounts for the acts of charity I presented above-
handing a donation to a homeless woman, gathering relief supplies
for a town hit by disaster, or searching the woods for a lost child.
But what motivates the soldier who spontaneously throws himself
on a grenade to save the lives of his comrades? What motivated
the abolitionists who risked their lives to smuggle slaves to free-
dom, and to engage in the broader struggle for Black emancipa-
tion?79 What motivates both right-to-life activists and abortion-
rights advocates to engage in passionate protest for their view of
the moral resolution of unwanted pregnancy?8 0 Their moral com-
mitment to a social cause seems far more critical to their actions
than their feelings of empathy toward others.
.III. Political Commitment
I do not think the search for sources of commitment to social
justice requires choosing between emotion and reason. This is
partly because I am not sure that empathy and self-interest are so
easily categorized. Isn't the desire to act in our own self-interest as
much an emotion as is the impulse to care for others? And isn't the
effort to imagine ourselves in another's position as much a cogni-
tive exercise as an emotional one? I think Martha Nussbaum is
right when she argues that we need both emotion and reason in
our moral decision making.
The more important question is, why must I be able to see my
own self-interest, or imagine myself in someone else's place, to join
hands with that person in political solidarity? Self-interest cannot
overcome the hurdles that racism puts in the way of social change.
Cultural empathy, although better than cultural bigotry, falls
short of changing the inferior political position of minority groups.
These flaws in both self-interest and empathy as sources of com-
mitment to social justice lead me to conclude that a shared polit-
ical commitment is needed to eradicate systems of domination and
to institute more egalitarian ones.
79. See Sarah Bradford, Harriet Tubman: The Moses of Her People (1961);
Frederick Douglass, Life and Times of Frederick Douglass (MacMillan 1962)
(1892); Wendell Phillips, Wendell Phillips on Civil Rights and Freedom (Louis Fil-
ler ed., 1965).
80. See Cynthia Gorney, Articles of Faith: A Frontline History of the Abortion
Wars (1998).
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This political commitment requires people in privileged places
to examine their own position far more than that of their neighbor.
More important than a white woman imagining she is her Latina
nanny; a male executive putting himself in the place of his secre-
tary; or a well-educated Black woman pretending to be a welfare
recipient is the recognition that their whiteness, gender and
wealth give them a privilege that the others do not have.8 ' This
task requires self-examination, not empathy. The next step re-
quires a willingness to join in political solidarity with their fellow
citizens to create more egalitarian institutions that will erode the
positions of privilege that they now enjoy.
I see this motivation to act as distinct from both self-interest
and empathy. It arises from my desire to take your side rather
than to find myself in you. It requires cultivating the ability to
distinguish between my needs and those of others, to see and re-
spect others as free and equal human beings regardless of whether
or not they are like me. This approach is closer to what German
philosopher Max Scheler calls genuine "Mitgefuhl"8 2 or true fellow-
feeling, the experience of someone else's joy or sorrow with "no ref-
erence to the state of one's own feelings."8 3 In my mind, we de-
velop the capacity for fellow feeling through a commitment to the
basic moral rule that all human beings deserve to be treated with
equal respect, not the other way around. I call this a political as
well as moral commitment because it can be realized only by trans-
forming unjust relationships of power.
Can people be inspired to act by abstract principles of justice?
The moral mandate of respect may be a reason to desire more egal-
itarian institutions, but can it motivate people to participate in the
struggle needed to create them? What will prevent people from
agreeing that establishing a more just society is a commendable
goal but then deciding to leave it to others to achieve it? Collective
action theorists contend that rational citizens will decline to invest
their time and money in joint efforts to change public policies,
81. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and The-
ory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 Yale J.L. & Feminism 217, 231-44 (1993)
(arguing that white feminists should devote more attention to white privi-
lege).
82. Peter Heath, Translator's Note to Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy
liii (W. Stark ed. & Peter Heath trans., Archon Books 1970) (1954).
83. Scheler, supra note 82, at 41. Adam Smith similarly described "fellow
feeling" in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, supra note 41.
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prefering to "free-ride" on the contributions of others.84 According
to this model, individuals' decision whether to commit their ener-
gies to an advocacy group will depend on the net personal benefit
they expect to receive from a change in policy minus the personal
costs they expect to incur from working toward that change.8 5 Be-
cause each individual's political activity is likely to be relatively
costly while having only an incremental effect on public policy at
best, few citizens will join the effort.
Charles Ogletree notes this gap between justification and mo-
tivation in his exploration of ways to inspire lawyers to become and
remain public defenders.8 6 Ogletree argues that the abundant
scholarship that focuses on the philosophical or moral justifica-
tions for the public defender's zealous advocacy on behalf of the
accused has limited utility for an attorney experiencing
"burnout."8 7 Ogletree contends:
Even if she agrees (as nearly all public defenders do) that vig-
orous defense of the guilty is morally justified in our adver-
sary system, that lawyer may not zealously represent a
criminal defendant absent a sufficiently compelling motiva-
tion-an impetus to do the work, rather than a theory that
merely argues that it is defensible, excusable, or laudable for
someone to do that work.88
However, Ogletree turns to empathy and self-interest-the very
strategies I have criticized-to motivate public defenders.
Even if abstract moral principles can provide some incentive to
act on behalf of others, will this incentive be enough to overcome
the competing inclination to serve oneself? The theologian Rein-
hold Niebuhr put the problem this way in Moral Man and Immoral
Society: "If reason projects goals more inclusive, and socially more
acceptable, than those which natural impulse prompts, the ques-
tion arises how an adequate dynamic toward the more inclusive
objective is gained."8 9 Niebuhr feared that human beings' "egoistic
84. See Russell Hardin, Collective Action 6-15 (1982).
85. See Warren L. Ratliff, The De-Evolution of Environmental Organization,
17 J. Land, Resources & Envtl. L. 45, 51-56 (1997).
86. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to
Sustain Public Defenders, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1239 (1993).
87. Id. at 1241-42.
88. Id. at 1242.
89. Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics
and Politics 35 (1960).
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impulses" easily co-opt reasons to do good and ultimately generate
moral justifications for following one's own interests.90 The power
of self-interest to overcome moral reason explains the failure of
Jeremy Bentham's reform movement premised on the theory that
prudent self-interest could be harmonized with broad social
goals.91 "'Man, from the very constitution of his nature,"' Ben-
tham stated in 1822, "'prefers his own happiness to that of all
other sentient beings put together.'"92
What, then, can provide the motivation for people to become
politically committed, and to live by an ethic more demanding and
respectful than self-interest and empathy? Although it is un-
fashionable to say so, religion is an important motivating forceY
3
For example, Christian faith relies on obedience-not self-in-
terest or even empathy-to motivate people to act. Christians are
to follow the example of Jesus Christ who sacrificed his life for the
unrighteous out of obedience to God's will. Christians are to strug-
gle against evil-because it is evil-regardless of how it affects
them personally. Religion inspires believers to act on moral com-
mitments: "requiring us to rethink our positions, demanding polit-
ical accountability, and, most importantly, necessitating a
discourse on substantive values and ends in a culture often too in-
strumentalist for its own good."94 By living the Christian life, be-
lievers discover a spiritual reward that surpasses self-interested
gain or emotional satisfaction.
Niebuhr argued that religious faith might liberate human be-
ings from the grip of egoism because "both the personality and the
holiness of God provide the religious man with a reinforcement of
90. Id. at 41.
91. See id. at 46.
92. Id. (quoting 10 Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham 80
(1962)).
93. Professor Carl Bogus commented after my lecture that religion currently
appears to motivate primarily conservative political action, as evidenced by the
ascendancy of the religious right. Of course, there are numerous counter-exam-
ples, such as the Black church's role in the civil rights movement, the Quakers'
abolitionist work, and liberation theology. As noted above in footnote 4 of this arti-
cle, an exploration of the links between strategy and ideology is an important pro-
ject that is beyond the scope of this article.
94. Anthony E. Cook, God-Talk in a Secular World, 6 Yale J.L. & Human. 435,
439 (1994) (reviewing Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American
Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion (1993)).
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his moral will and a restraint upon his will-to-power."95 Religion
turns abstract moral duties into concrete obligations toward the
supreme being. Unlike empathy, religious faith promotes love of
one's neighbor through its introspective character. Religion,
Niehbuhr contended, has been the most effective means of "making
men conscious of the sinfulness of their preoccupation with self."96
Religious devotion might be a fruitful focus for research on
people's motivations to support social causes. We should tap the
power of religious faith to overcome the shortcomings of self-inter-
est and empathy, and explore whether it can provide a guide for
non-religious commitments to social justice.
Two researchers set out to learn what motivates some mem-
bers of affluent churches to give more money to their churches than
others do.97 They used two theoretical approaches-exchange the-
ory and symbolic interactionism-to examine religious giving,
which correspond to two of the approaches I discussed-self-inter-
est and political commitment. According to exchange theory, peo-
ple are inclined to participate in an action when they believe the
benefits of the action outweigh the costs.9 8 This theory would pre-
dict that church members who feel that they belong to a special
church that serves their needs will be motivated to reciprocate
with donations to maintain the church. According to symbolic in-
teractionalism, on the other hand, "people sometimes do things
which they consider right or meaningful, even when the costs out-
weigh the benefits."99 This theory supports the hypothesis that
church members who believe strongly in God, and desire to live
according to His commandments, are more likely to donate to their
churches as an expression of their faith. The first group donates
because of its benefit orientation, while the second donates because
of its belief orientation.
The study discovered that "intrinsic religiousity," which com-
bines elements of both theories, was the most important factor in
promoting participation in church life and increasing members'
95. Niebuhr, supra note 89, at 54.
96. Id.
97. See James D. Davidson & Ralph E. Pyle, Passing the Plate in Affluent
Churches: Why Some Members Give More than Others, 36 Rev. Religious Res. 181
(1994).
98. See id. at 182.
99. Id. at 183.
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willingness to donate to the church. °0 0 Intrinsic religiousity de-
scribes a "highly personal, yet socially conscious, pattern of faith
... in which individuals identify the centrality of their religious
convictions in relation to the benefits derived from their beliefs
about God and their involvement with society."10 1 The integration
of members' self-concept and the benefits derived from their faith
are reflected in beliefs such as "My faith turns my attention from
my own needs and toward the needs of others" and "I see my work
in life as God's work."10 2
This intrinsic orientation to faith links personal belief with
human interdependence and individual salvation with social con-
cern. Niebuhr concluded that religion alone will fail "in becoming
an instrument and inspiration of social justice" 0 3 because it de-
pends on the insights of sensitive individual conscience rather
than social consciousness. Although individual devotion might suf-
fice to create intimate religious communities that are just, it can-
not bring about broad social change. Intrinsic religiousity suggests
a model that connects religion's introspective power to overcome
egoism with the social consciousness Niebuhr argued was neces-
sary for broad social transformation.
We should not underestimate the power of abstract notions of
justice to motivate non-religious people, as well, to participate in
social movements. Researchers have discovered that individuals
engage in prosocial acts to benefit others because they have inter-
nalized moral principles rather than because they feel caring emo-
tions. 10 4 Alphonso Pinkney's 1968 study of white Americans who
were active in the civil rights movement, The Committed, confirms
that a sense of moral outrage and responsibility does indeed in-
spire many people to sacrifice for others.' 05
Pinkney asked white civil rights activists: "'[wihat would you
say is the single most important thing which made you decide to
become active in the struggle for Negro rights?"' 10 6 The most com-
100. Id. at 192-93.
101. Id. at 184.
102. Id.
103. Niebuhr, supra note 89, at 80.
104. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 44, at 389-90 (citing Kohn, supra note 42,
at 127).
105. Alphonso Pinkney, The Committed: White Activists in the Civil Rights
Movement (1968).
106. Id. at 97.
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mon answer was that respondents became involved because of ide-
ology and literature about the civil rights movement.10 7 Pinkney
concluded that comments falling in this category "indicate a kind
of ethical and moral conviction which seems to have motivated
nearly one-fourth of the activists in the present study to action." 08
Examples of reasons for involvement include: "'A deep commit-
ment to the right of the individual to participate freely in the total
society;'" "'[tihe opportunity came for me to make my witness to
what I believe;'" "'[t]he unwavering 'rightness' of the issue;'" "'I be-
came active in the struggle because I feel it is not right for me to
have more advantages in life because I am white;"' "'[glrowth of
racist resistance to civil and human rights;'" "'knowledge that ra-
cism destroys all democratic institutions;'" "'[moral responsibil-
ity;'" "'[tihe ethical and moral aspects of segregation and the utter
contradictions between segregation and our ideology of brother-
hood, justice, and democracy;'" "'[a] philosophical and emotional
identification with the oppressed;'" "'[dleep-seated sense of outrage
at inequality-conflict between what we profess as a nation and
what we do in reality;'" and "'I believe it is wrong for any man to be
hated, discriminated against or prejudiced against because of his
color. While these things happen I cannot stand by and not be
active.' "109
These findings were reflected in Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
organizing strategy during the first stage of the civil rights move-
ment. His campaign offers an example of a successful progressive
coalition that crossed boundaries of class and race to advocate
structural change. Although King acknowledged the practical con-
sideration of appealing to white self-interest, he stressed the
greater imperative of making the moral decision. King proclaimed,
"f[these are practical political considerations all dictating one road.
Yet above it all, a greater imperative demands fulfillment.
Throughout our history, the moral decision has always been the
correct decision." 110
107. See id. at 98.
108. Id. at 100.
109. Id. at 98-99.
110. Martin Luther King, Jr., Bold Design for a New South, reprinted in A Tes-
tament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. 116 (James
Melvin Washington ed., 1986).
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Another example of altruism inspired by moral principle are
the acts of gentile rescuers of Jews in Europe during the Nazi re-
gime. One study of these rescuers found that they were motivated
to act altruistically on behalf of others by their identification with a
"globalized" humanity. 1 ' Why do I describe this motivation as a
moral principle rather than empathy? The rescuers did not have to
imagine themselves in the endangered Jews' position to act on the
Jews' behalf. Their inspiration did not necessarily involve an emo-
tional connection with the people for whom they sacrificed.
Rather, as Menkel-Meadow observed, their identification with
others "was a generalized appreciation of the plight of all human
beings: it did not seem to require the particularized appreciation of
the other commonly associated with empathy."112 This genera-
lized appreciation of humanity derives more from the moral imper-
ative to treat others with respect than from a feeling of concern
about particular individuals.
I do not want to suggest that abstract moral teaching all by
itself will suffice to motivate people to act altruistically. Menkel-
Meadow also notes that "[slome studies indicate that learning to
care must be situated in concrete learning rather than in general,
abstracted learning."113 William Simon has also recently advo-
cated replacing the traditional abstract method of teaching legal
ethics with an approach that emphasizes the context of lawyers'
moral decision making. 114 These are important techniques for
helping citizens to embrace and understand a political commit-
ment to social justice. Storytelling along the lines proposed by
Nussbaum and others can inspire people to act on their moral prin-
ciples and help them to discern what action is needed. Neverthe-
less, I am convinced that the fundamental reason why people
111. See Kristen R. Monroe et al., Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action:
Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, 101 Ethics 103 (1990); see also Samuel P. Oliner
& Pearl M. Oliner, The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe
(1988) (discussing the non-Jewish rescuers who helped Jews without regard for
harm to themselves or their families due to a connection with humanity as a
whole).
112. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 44, at 399; see also Christopher Jencks, Vari-
eties of Altruism, in Beyond Self-Interest, supra note 5, at 53 (distinguishing
among three sources of unselfishness: empathy, community, and morality).
113. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 44, at 416. Menkel-Meadow notes further
that "feelings and emotions are relevant to deciding what is just and moral in this
world...." Id. at 417.
114. See William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice (1998).
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sacrifice their own self-interest to promote the interests of others is
a political commitment to justice.
IV. Conclusion
Some readers might object that all I have done is set out a
lofty ideal that is even less feasible than the two sources of commit-
ment that I have criticized. At least appeals to empathy and self-
interest, they might point out, are strategies with some track rec-
ord that seem grounded in human nature. Perhaps any successful
movement for social change, recognizing the complexity of human
motivation, must incorporate these approaches to some extent.
The task may involve redefining self-interest to encompass a polit-
ical commitment to social justice. Developing empathy, moreover,
can enhance our moral dedication to act on behalf of others.
I hope that I have demonstrated, however, that empathy and
self-interest as they are presently conceived cannot provide the
motivation needed to achieve social justice, especially given
America's roadblock of racism. Although it would be foolish to dis-
regard these sources of human motivation, we should devote more
attention to a third basis for action. We need to generate a polit-
ical commitment-a form of political solidarity-that is derived
more from a moral imperative than from narrow self-interest or
selfish empathy. This political commitment is based not on the
question "What is in it for me?" or "How are you like me?" but
"How can I be on your side?"
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